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Abstract 
 
This paper assesses governance in twenty-eight EU Member States (EUMS) by comparing these 
states among themselves and with the rest of the world, utilising three indicators relating to 
political, economic and social governance.  The main contributions of this paper on the issue of 
governance are three. First the paper includes economic and social governance in the meaning of 
the term “governance”. Studies on governance generally use indicators associated with politics and 
public administration. Secondly, it attempts to place the governance scores of the EU Member 
states, as a block, in an international context. Thirdly, the study tries to explain why GDP growth and 
governance indicators are often found to be negatively correlated.  
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Governance in the EU Member States – 
Evidence from Three Global Indicators 
by Professor Lino Briguglio
*
 
1. Introduction 
This paper assesses governance in twenty-eight EU Member States (EUMS) by comparing these states 
among themselves and with the rest of the world, utilising three indicators relating to political, 
economic and social governance.  
The indicators used are: 
1. the Worldwide Governance Indicators to measure political governance;  
2. the Macroeconomic Stability sub-index of the Economic Resilience Index to measure economic 
governance; and  
3. the non-income component of the Human Development Index to measure social governance. 
The title of the second and third indicators does not directly refer to governance, but they are strongly 
related to economic and social policies, which are themselves closely associated with economic and 
social governance.  
The main contributions of this paper on the issue of governance are three. First the paper includes 
economic and social governance in the meaning of the term “governance”. Studies on governance 
generally use indicators associated with politics and public administration. Secondly, it attempts to place 
the governance scores of the EU Member states, as a block, in an international context. Thirdly, the 
study tries to explain why GDP growth and governance indicators are often found to be negatively 
correlated.   
The paper is organised in seven sections. Following this introduction, Section 2 briefly presents some 
background information on the EUMS, related to their population, GDP per capita and rates of economic 
growth. Section 3 presents a literature review focussing on matters relating to the theme of the paper. 
Section 4 describes the three indicators in some details, and presents the political, economic and social 
governance scores of the EUMS, while Section 5 compares the score of the EUMS indicators with those 
of other countries. Correlations between the governance scores and economic performance are 
discussed in Section 6. The last section summarises the main tendencies identified in the previous two 
sections and derives a number of implications relating to the EU Member States. 
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2. Background on the EU 
The European Union consists of 28 deeply integrated countries, each of which has relinquished part of 
its sovereignty to the EU institutions. Since its creation, during the second half of the 1950s the Union 
evolved from a community of six countries closely cooperating in trade into an economic and political 
union, based on treaties leading to binding agreements between the member states.  
Out of the 28 member states, only six countries, namely Germany, UK, France, Spain, Italy and Poland, 
can be considered as large states. The remaining 22 states are relatively small. Figure 1 shows that the 
majority of EUMS have a population of about 10 million or less, with Malta, Luxembourg and Cyprus 
having a population of less than 1 million each. 
Figure 1: Population of the EU Member States 
 
 
Figure 2 shows the income per capita of the EUMS. It can be seen that in 2013, the average GDP per 
capita was about US$32,000 with most countries generating an income per capita exceeding US$20,000. 
This is a relatively high income per capita, which means that most EUMS are classified as High Income 
Economies (HEI) by the World Bank.1 
Figure 3 shows the average growth rates in real GDP of the EUMS between 2003 and 2013. The growth 
rates of almost all EUMS were on the low side, with the majority registering a rate below 1.8%, the 
average growth of all the EUMS taken together. The slow growth rates in the EU would seem to 
                                                 
1
 The exceptions are Romania and Bulgaria, which are classified as Upper Middle Income Economies.  
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contradict the often assumed connection between economic growth and governance, given that the EU 
as a whole is characterised by relatively high governance scores, as we shall show below. 
Figure 2: GDP Per Capita (2013, US$000) of the EU Member States 
 
Source: IMF (2014) 
Figure 3: Percentage Change in GDP (2003-2013) of the EU Member Stats 
 
Source: IMF (2014) 
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3. Literature Review 
3.1 The Meaning of Governance 
The word Governance may refer to the administrative and decision-making processes relating to states, 
corporations, and other organisations, but in this study the term is used with reference to states.   
Most definitions of governance of states are associated with politics and public administration, but, as 
Kaufman et al. (2010) argue, although the concept of governance is widely discussed among 
policymakers and scholars, there is as yet no strong consensus around a single definition of it or of 
institutional quality.   
The same authors state that in specific areas of governance such as rule of law, there are extensive 
debates among scholars over “thin” versus “thick” definitions, where the former focus narrowly on 
whether existing rules and laws are enforced, while the latter emphasize more whether the content of 
laws leads to justice.  
Khan (2007) distinguished between market-enhancing versus growth-enhancing types of governance, 
associating market-enhancing governance with a liberal economic stance that facilitates the operation 
of the market mechanism and reduces transaction costs. Khan linked the growth-enhancing form of 
governance with the leadership role of government aimed at overcoming market failures, promoting 
investment, particularly in infrastructure, in the use of resources and technological development.  
Khan argued that these two forms of governance may not be mutually exclusive. In addition, Khan 
contends that what may be successful in one country need not be so in another, giving as an example 
the growth-enhancing type of government in a number of East Asian countries, though this model of 
governance did not work successfully in other countries. 
 In some strands of the literature, governance is closely associated with institutions, since these are 
essential for enforcing property rights and putting in place legal/administrative systems (Rodrik, 2008, 
Brown, 2010).  
The basic argument in this context is that weak institutions may directly hamper effective economic, 
social and political management and, in addition, may inhibit economic growth due to various factors, 
including lack of investment. 
Corruption features prominently in many studies on Governance. Some studies indicate that corruption 
is extensive in developing countries (Svensson, 2005). Corruption may be beneficial to the persons who 
bribe and those bribed, but it creates various economic disadvantages, including additional costs to 
firms and negative effects on the provision of goods and services by the government (Olken & Pande, 
2011). Corruption also generates an atmosphere of uncertainty and dishonesty.  Some studies (e.g., 
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Huntington, 1968) suggest that corruption can be beneficial, when governments are autocratic and 
remain in power by hook or by crook. However, as Easterly (2006) argued, claims that corruption 
“greases the wheels” of growth simply do not stand up to empirical scrutiny. 
A definition of governance, in line with the approach taken in this paper, and as proposed by the 
European Commission (2006), underlines the importance of defining its political, economic and social 
dimensions. Similarly, the World Bank’s PRSP Handbook, defines governance in terms of the manner in 
which “power is exercised through a country’s economic, political, and social institutions.”  
3.2 Governance in the EU 
The EU places good governance as one of its major objectives. It is to be based on openness, 
participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence (European Commission, 2001). In practice, the 
quality of governance of most EU individual member states, in terms of rule of law and other democratic 
requisites, is among the highest in the world, as can be seen in the so-called Kaufmann Index, which is 
one of the indicators used in this study.  However there is a major criticism relating to the EU’s 
supranational governance, with some authors questioning whether the EU institutions are truly 
democratic and transparent, in their responsiveness to citizen concerns and in their efficacy, 
accountability and transparency (Schmidt, 2013). 
 
3.2.1 Political governance 
Auel and Christiansen (2015), writing specifically on political governance in the EU, refer to the 
constraints imposed by the European Commission on National Parliaments’ ability to scrutinize new EU 
legislation because  directives and regulations often lack clarity and tend to be highly technical.  
Lindseth (2012) questions whether the EU system of government is really, ‘government of the people’ 
given that within the EU there is the cultural perception that the Union’s supranational institutions are 
not genuinely the people’s own. (On this issue see also Liebert et al., 2013 and Lindgren and Persson, 
2011). 
In addition, some authors (e.g. Ayers, 2008) refer to the style of EU governance, which, even while 
promoting the participation of Civil society, is too much oriented toward liberal market-based policies. 
 
3.2.2 Economic governance 
With respect to economic governance, the EU has put in place regulatory frameworks which encourage 
competition and control abuse. The Stability and Growth Pact aims at promoting growth while 
encouraging prudent fiscal policy. However in practice, these arrangements have not so far managed to 
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pull the EU out of slow growth and high unemployment (European Commission, 2015a). Also, 
Governments have found it too easy to ignore the strictures of the Stability and Growth Pact without 
being punished. 
Some authors consider these schemes as being too much market oriented (Lendhorf, 2015). Other 
authors further criticize the economic governance of the EU during the euro crises, arguing that the 
austerity policies imposed on countries, was authoritarian and may have threatened democracy.  
The euro-crisis has also been considered as a governance crises, due to the fact that there was 
disagreement as to how to control financial imbalances, price and wage divergences and an insufficient 
focus on debt sustainability, leading to calls for more stringent control over national finances (Sapir and 
Wolff, 2015) .  
On the other hand, Giannone, (2015) criticized the economic governance of the EU during the euro 
crises for imposing austerity policies on countries, calling it authoritarian and a possible threat to 
democracy. 
 3.2.3 Social governance 
Social policy is one of the most important components of the EU governance framework, based on 
advanced social security schemes, high quality health services and rules that govern educational systems 
in member states (European Commission, 2015b, Anderson, K, 2015). The EU runs the European Social 
Fund which has had several successes in the social sphere (European Commission, 2015c). 
Although the individual EUMS have adopted different social models, namely Nordic, Anglo-Saxon, 
Mediterranean and Continental (Sapir, 2005), they share major characteristics, including the promotion 
of employment, improved living and working conditions, social protection and dialogue between 
management and labour. 
Several weaknesses have been identified in the EU social model. An argument that is often put forward 
with regard to the EU social policy is that it is overdeveloped and may be leading to rigidities in the 
labour market and the discouragement of effort (Flynn, 1998).   
An opposite argument, advanced by some authors (e.g. Mabille, 2012; Vaughan-Whitehead, 2014) is 
that the EU Institutions are abandoning the European social model and seeking neoliberal solutions, 
leading to excessive austerity and unemployment and threats to social welfare spending.  
Some authors identify various contradictions between the EU social governance and its economic 
governance. By way of example, Rubery et al. (2008) refer to competition policy as posing significant 
challenges to national employment and social models, with significant consequences relating to the 
organisation of employment and the maintenance of labour standards. Heins and de la Porte (2014), 
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referring to the EU Commission’s emphasis on fiscal consolidation, state that this has led to increased 
involvement in and constraints on national budgets, of which welfare state spending is an important 
component.  
3.3 The Relationship between Governance and Economic Performance 
3.3.1 Governance and GDP Per Capita 
The relationship between good governance indicators and the GDP per capita of countries, is generally 
found to be positive with a high degree of correlation between the two variables, as confirmed in the 
present study. This relationship is also found in more rigorous and complicated studies on this issue, 
notably in Kaufman and Kraay (2002).2 
 There is however some debate about the direction of causality. Kaufman and Kraay (2002) show that 
per capita income and the quality of governance are strongly positively correlated across countries. They 
find a strong positive causal effect running from better governance to higher per capita income, and a 
weak and even negative causal effect running in the opposite direction from per capita income to 
governance.  
 3.3.2 Governance and Real GDP Growth 
This study presents simple correlation coefficients between governance indictors and economic growth, 
which generally indicate that the relationship is not positive, but possibly negative. This is in line with 
neoclassical growth theory which predicts that lower income countries should converge, since 
theoretically they should tend to grow at a faster rate than higher income ones due to the law of 
diminishing marginal product with regard to capital, which is more abundant in developed countries. 
This neo-classical convergence theory associated with Solow (1956) and Cass (1965), leads to the 
argument that a country's growth rate tends to be inversely related to its starting level of income per 
capita.  
Intuitively, one should think that economically backward countries can grow faster than advanced 
countries also because the former countries can copy and adopt readily available technologies invented 
by countries that developed before them. This catching-up by technological laggards has been termed 
the “advantage of backwardness” by Gerschenkron (1952). 
 In spite of this, several publications associate good governance, and the necessary institutions for this, 
with growth. A substantial body of literature considers good governance as a precondition for growth 
(Kaufmann, 2005; Rivera-Batiz, 2002) and similarly with regard to governance institutions (Acemoglu et 
al., 2005; North; 1990; Aron, 2000; Commission on Growth and Development, 2008).   
                                                 
2
 See Baland et al. (2009) for a discussion on this relationship.  
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Quantitative studies on the relationship between governance and economic growth, using a cross-
section of countries, employ somewhat complicated model specifications (see for example Fayissa and 
Nsiah, 2010; Riviera-Batiz, 2002 ), and the results tend to be difficult to interpret (Kurts and Schrank 
(2007).  
The direction of causation of economic growth and governance is also a matter of debate, with some 
authors arguing in favour of the theory that growth comes first, and governance and the accompanying 
institutions later (e.g. Durlauf et al., 2005; Glaeser et al., 2004). 
 The relationship between economic growth and governance has been questioned by Kurtz and Schrank 
(2007) who doubt whether such a connection exists and who further question whether the data used to 
measure governance as well as the methods used to estimate such a relationships are good enough.3   
 Rodrik (2008) argues that there are many countries that are growing rapidly despite poor governance to 
render suspect any general claim to the contrary and governance is generally not a prerequisite for 
getting growth going. Rodrik also opines that as a rule, broad governance reform is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for growth, and therefore a broad governance agenda rarely deserves priority as part of a 
growth strategy, except in rare instances where “weak governance is specifically identified as a generic 
area of binding constraints”. 
 The literature on the effect of good governance on economic growth, at best, therefore, sends 
contradictory signals, with some authors, notably Kaufman and Kraay (2002) arguing strongly in favour 
of the connection and others, such as Rodrik (2008) and Kurts and Schrank (2007) arguing that there is 
no reliable evidence that such a connection exists.  
4. The Indicators Used to Measure Governance 
This section describes the three indicators used in this study, which respectively relate to political, 
economic and social governance namely (a) the Worldwide Governance Indicators; (b) Macroeconomic 
stability index of the Resilience Index and (c) the non-income components of the Human Development 
Index.   
4.1 The Worldwide Governance Indicators 
The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)4 have six dimensions namely (1) voice and accountability 
(2) political stability and absence of violence (3) government effectiveness (4) regulatory quality (5) rule 
of law and (6) control of corruption. The scores assigned to each country range from approximately -2.5 
                                                 
3
 See also Sundaram and Chowdhury (2012) for studies that question the governance and growth connection. 
4
 The most recent (2013) WGI scores are available at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home . 
The indicators are based on the views of persons involved in business, ordinary citizens and expert surveys, with 
sources derived from various institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, 
and private sector firms. 
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to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better governance. A detailed description of the 
methodology is given in Kaufmann et al. (2010). A simple average of the six dimensions for 2013 was 
computed for the purpose of this study. 
The data for the WGI was re-scaled using the so-called Max-Min formula which transforms the original 
scores into a range from 0 to 1. This was done to enable aggregation of the WGI scores with those of the 
other two governance indicators, since the three indicators are measured along different scales. 
The Min-Max formula can be expressed as: 
SRSi = (Si – Smin) / (Smax – Smin)        i = 1,2,3,…,183    
Where SRSi is the re-scaled score in a governance index, for country i, in an array of 183 observations; Si 
is the actual score of country i in the same array; Smin is the minimum score in the same array of 
observations; and Smax is the maximum score in the same array. 
The data for the WGI scores, pertaining to the EUMS, is shown graphically in Figure 4. It can be seen that 
Finland and Sweden are the best politically-governed EUMS whereas Romania and Bulgaria are the 
worst, according to the WGI. It should also be noted that even the lowest score in the EU is still 
relatively high by international standards, as we shall show below. 
 
Figure 4: The EUMS WGI Scores  
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4.2 Macroeconomic stability component of the Economic Resilience Index 
The Macroeconomic stability component of the Economic Resilience Index (STB), which was developed 
by  Briguglio et al. (2009) and was recently updated by  Briguglio (2014), contains three sub-indices, 
namely (a) inflation (measured by the GDP deflator)5, (b) debt as a ratio of GDP and (c) current account 
imbalances as a ration of GDP. These indicators were chosen because they were thought to be policy 
induced and thus closely related to economic governance. In addition, these three variables are 
available for almost all the countries of the World. A detailed description of the method used to 
construct the STB is given in Briguglio (2014). All observations were again rescaled using the Max-Min 
formula, so as to enable aggregation of variables measured in different scales. The data was sourced 
from the IMF World Economic Outlook database6 and the three sub-indices were averaged using equal 
weights.  
The data for the STB scores pertaining to the EUMS is shown graphically as Figure 5. It can be seen that 
Luxembourg and Sweden are the best economically-governed member states whereas Italy and Greece 
are the worst.  
 
Figure 5: The EUMS STB Scores  
 
                                                 
5
 The GDP deflator rather than the Retail Price Index was chosen as an indicator of inflation so as to exclude 
imported inflation, which is not likely to be policy induced. 
6
 The database is available at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/02/weodata/index.aspx . 
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4.3 Non-Income components of the Human Development Index 
The Human Development Index (HDI)7 measures the average achievements in a country in three  basic 
dimensions of human development, namely health (measured by life expectancy), education (measured 
by the average years of schooling and expected years of schooling)8 and the standard of living, 
measured by the log of GNI per capita (PPP $). The HDI is an average of the three dimensions. A 
description of the methodology is available in Klugman et al. (2011).  
The Non-income HDI (NYH), used in the study, consists of two of the three HDI components namely (a) 
the health and (b) the education components. These two components are thought to be policy induced 
and closely related to social governance.  
The NYH was measured by assigning a weight of 50% to the health component and 25% to each of the 
educational components (the same procedure used by the HDI compilers), and the result was again 
rescaled using the Min-Max formula so that the values of the NYH index ranged between 0 and 1.   
Figure 6, graphically shows the data for the NYH scores pertaining to the EUMS. The index shows that 
Ireland and the Netherlands are the best socially governed member states whereas Romania and 
Bulgaria are the worst.  
Figure 6: EUMS NYH Scores  
 
4.3 The Average of the Three Indicators 
The three indicators, respectively relating to political, economic and social governance, were averaged. 
The results for the EUMS are shown graphically in Figure 7. This figure shows that the best-governed 
member states were Sweden and the Netherlands, whereas Romania and Bulgaria are the worst, in 
terms of the average of the political, economic and social governance indicators. 
                                                 
7
 The data for this study was sourced from the 2014 HDI, available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/data . 
8
 Mean of years of schooling for adults aged 25 years and expected years of schooling for children of school 
entering age.  
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In general, it emerges that the Northern and Western EUMS tend to be better governed than the Easter 
and Southern EUMS. There are however some exceptions, particularly Spain, Italy and Malta, which 
register a below average governance score and they are counted among the western countries. 
Figure 8: EUMS AVG Scores  
 
5. The EUMS Scores Compared with the Rest of the World 
5.1 Political governance scores compared 
As already explained, the index used in this study to measure political governance is the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI), which, it should be recalled were rescaled in a range of values from 0 to 1.   
It can be seen from Table 1 that the average political governance score for the EU exceeds the average 
for high-income countries.9  In addition, it can be seen from Table 2 that that the five  best politically-
governed EUMS register relatively high scores, when compared to the five most-economically-advanced 
non-EU countries, with the highest scores pertaining to Finland, Sweden and Denmark in that order. 
  
                                                 
9
 The income classification is that used by the World Bank. The classification is available at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/news/2015-country-classifications  
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Table 1: EUMS WGI Scores Compared with Other Country Groups 
 Countries WGI Scores 
 Average (EUMS) 0.802 
 Average Eurozone 0.819  
 Average: all countries 0.459  
 High-income-countries' average 0.744  
 Upper-middle-income countries' average 0.423  
 Lower-middle-income countries' average 0.334  
 Low-income countries' average 0.219  
 
Table 2: High EUMS WGI scores compared with other Highly-Advanced Countries 
 Country WGI Scores 
 Finland 1.000 
 Sweden 0.989 
 Denmark 0.984 
 Luxembourg 0.965 
 Netherlands 0.960 
 Australia 0.931 
 Canada 0.939 
 Japan 0.867 
 New Zealand  0.990 
 United States 0.844 
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5.2 Economic Governance Scores Compared 
Economic governance is measured by the macroeconomic stability component of the Economic 
Resilience Index (STB).  It can be seen from Table 3 that economic governance in the EU is slightly lower 
than the average for all high-income countries, but higher than other country groups.   
In addition, it can be seen from Table 4 that the five  best economically governed EUMS, register 
relatively high scores, comparable to the five  most-economically-advanced non-EU countries, with the 
highest scores pertaining to Luxembourg, Sweden and Denmark in that order. 
Table 3: EUMS STB Scores Compared with Other Country Groups 
Global Comparisons STB Scores 
 Average (EUMS) 0.608 
 Average Eurozone 0.606 
 Average: all countries 0.540 
 High-income-countries' average 0.629 
 Upper-middle-income countries' average 0.529 
 Lower-middle-income countries' average 0.509 
 Low-income countries’ average 0.451 
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Table 4: High EUMS STB scores compared with other Highly-Advanced Countries 
Country STB Scores 
 Luxembourg 0.772 
 Sweden 0.727 
 Denmark 0.698 
 Finland 0.695 
 Netherlands 0.695 
 Australia 0.680 
 Canada 0.576 
 Japan 0.361 
 New Zealand  0.664 
 United States 0.544 
 
5.3 Social governance scores compared 
As explained above, social governance is measured in this study by the non-income components of the 
Human Development Index (HDI).  It can be seen from Table 5 that social governance in the EU is higher 
than the average for high-income countries.  
In addition, Table 6 shows that the best five socially-governed EUMS register relatively high scores, 
comparable to those of the 5 highly-advanced non-EU countries, with Ireland, the Netherlands and 
Germany registering the highest social-governance scores. However, worldwide, Australia had the 
highest score in this regard. 
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Table 5: EUMS NYH scores compared with Other Country Groups 
Global Comparisons NYH Scores  
 Average (EUMS) 0.833  
 Average Eurozone 0.843  
 Average: all countries 0.578  
 High-income-countries' average 0.809  
 Upper-middle-income countries' average 0.639  
 Lower-middle-income countries' average 0.464  
 Low-income countries’ average 0.257 
 
Table 6: High EUMS NYH scores compared with other Highly-Advanced Countries 
Country NYH Scores 
 Ireland 0.922 
 Netherlands 0.921 
 Germany 0.912 
 United Kingdom 0.893 
 Denmark 0.885 
 Australia 1.000 
 Canada 0.903 
 Japan 0.904 
 New Zealand 0.963 
 United States 0.889 
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5.4 Average Scores of the Three Indicators Compared  
As already explained, the three indicators respectively relating to political, economic and social 
governance were averaged and rescaled to render them suitable for taking their average. The results are 
shown in Tables 7 and 8.  
Table 7 shows that the average score for the EU member states is higher than that of high income 
countries, while Table 8 shows that the five top EUMS have relatively high scores when compared with 5 
highly-advanced non-EU member states. 
In the EU Sweden, Netherlands, Denmark, Luxembourg and Finland are the best performers, whereas 
the worst five performers are Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, Greece and Rumania. 
Table 7: EUMS AVG Scores Compared with Other Country Groups 
Global Comparisons AVG Scores 
 Average (EU) 0.822 
 Average Eurozone 0.846 
 Average: all countries 0.544 
 High-income-countries' average 0.698 
 Upper-middle-income countries' average 0.549 
 Lower-middle-income countries' average 0.427 
 Low-income countries’ average 0.263 
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Table 8: High EUMS AVG scores compared with other Highly-Advanced Countries 
Country AVG Scores 
 Sweden 0.991 
 Netherlands 0.975 
 Denmark 0.973 
 Luxembourg 0.971 
 Finland 0.968 
 Australia 0.988 
 Canada 0.905 
 Japan 0.776 
 New Zealand 0.995 
 United States 0.838 
 
5.5 Tendencies that emerge by comparing the EUMS in a global context 
Tables 4 to 8 indicate that in general the governance scores of the EUMS are comparable with those of 
the best governed and the most developed countries in the world. Although there is a spread of 
governance performance within the EU itself, with the northern and western countries tending to 
register higher scores than the southern and eastern countries, the average governance score for the EU 
still remains a relatively high score, particularly with regard to political and social governance. 
In the case of economic governance, which was based on economic stability (Tables 3 and 4), the EUMS 
scores were not as high as the political and social governance scores, due to the economic instability 
that the EU passed through, as evidenced by the high debt ratios of a number of EU member states. 
However, by international comparisons, the average economic governance scores of the EUMS were still 
relatively high in a global context, as many non-EU countries registered relatively lower scores, when 
compared to political and social governance, reflecting the global economic instability after 2007.    
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6. Governance Scores and Economic Performance 
As has been shown above, the governance scores of the EUMS are generally high, when compared to 
other countries. The EUMS generate relatively high GDP per capita indicating that governance and per 
capita income tend to be correlated, as we shall show below. However, the EUMS are not characterized 
by high growth rates, suggesting that governance and GDP growth rates are negatively correlated. This 
issue will be discussed further below.  
6.1 Relationship with GDP Per Capita
10
 
It is interesting to test whether the GDP per capita of the EUMS, as a block, are compatible with their 
governance scores. This is done in the present study by (a) correlating the governance scores of the 
EUMS with their respective per capita income and (b) correlating the scores of 183 countries with their 
GDP per capita. The results of the correlation exercise are shown in Table 9. 
 
Table 9: Correlation between the Governance Scores and GDP per Capita 
Variable  
Correlation with 
WGI 
Correlation  with 
STB 
Correlations with 
NYH 
Correlations with 
AVG 
Within the EU 0.86* 0.48* 0.78* 0.85* 
Worldwide 0.78* 0.47* 0.86* 0.87* 
* Indicates that the relation between the governance scores and GDP per capita is different from zero at 
the 95% level of statistical significance. 
 
It can be seen from Table 9 that there is a positive correlation between the Governance scores and GDP 
per capita, within the EU and Globally.11 These results reflect the tendency, identified in many studies, 
that the more developed countries enjoy better political, economic and social governance. 
 
                                                 
10
 Data for GDP per capita and for economic growth were sourced from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook 
database available at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/01/weodata/index.aspx . 
11
 The t-statistic relates to the coefficient on the governance indices. The asterisk on the correlation coefficient 
indicates that it is different from zero at the 95% level of statistical significance. It should be noted that the simple 
correlation exercises presented in this study do not capture variables, other than governance, that may affect GDP 
per capita. It is therefore being emphasized that the purpose of the exercise is not to identify the factors that lead to 
high GDP per capita, but to simply check whether high income countries tend to be characterized by high 
governance scores and vice-versa. 
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The relationship between the governance scores, on the vertical axis, and GDP per capita on the 
horizontal axis,12 is also shown graphically in Figure 9. The data covers the EUMS as a block (indicated by 
a large marker) and 155 countries (that is 183 countries for which data was available less 28 EUMS). The 
figure consists of four panels, the first three referring to the three indicators of governance and the 
fourth to the average of these three indicators.  
The four diagrams confirm that: 
• in terms of political and social governance, the EU average is above the average of those 
countries with comparable GDP per capita, as shown by the large marker above the trend line; 
• in terms of economic governance the EU average is on the trend line;  
• the average of the three scores is also above the trend line.  
This means that the EUMS, considered as a block, attained higher political governance scores than their 
income comparators, although they did not excel in economic governance. 
 
Figure 9: The relationship between the Governance scores and GDP per capita 
WGI and GDP Per Capita          STB and GDP Per Capita 
  
 
 
 
               
        NYH and GDP Per Capita                                                                                 AVG and GDP Per Capita 
                                                                                                                     
 
                                                 
12
 GDP per capita is measured in logs so as to reduce the spread of the horizontal axis. In addition, an inspection of 
the data showed clearly the relationship was non-linear as follows and the best fit was Y=A + log(X):   
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6.2 Relationship with GDP Growth 
It is also interesting to test whether the real GDP growth rates are in line with their governance scores. 
This is done in the present study by (a) correlating the governance scores of the EUMS with their 
respective growth rates and (b) correlating the scores of 183 countries with their respective growth 
rates.13 The results of the correlation exercises are shown in Table 10.  GDP growth is measured over the 
period (2003-2013). Growth rates for other time-periods were also correlated with the governance 
scores and the overall results were similar to the ones reported in Table 10  
It can be seen that all three scores are negatively correlated with economic growth when 183 countries 
are considered, although the STB indicator exhibited a very low correlation coefficient. In the case of the 
EU, there is also a tendency for WGI and NYH to be negatively correlated with economic growth. What 
can be concluded from these results is that there is no indication that governance is positively correlated 
with growth rates.  
 
                                                 
13
 It is being emphasized again that the correlation exercises presented in this study do not capture variables, other 
than governance, that may affect economic growth. The purpose of the exercise is not to identify the factors that lead 
to economic growth, as done in Durlauf et al. (2005) and Kurts and Schrank (2007), but to simply check whether 
fast growing countries are characterized by high go
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Table 10: Correlations between Governance Scores and Real GDP Growth Rates (2003-13) 
Variable  
Correlations 
with WGI 
Correlations with 
STB 
Correlations 
with NYH 
Correlations 
with AVG 
EU -0.20n 0.25n -0.55* -0.17n 
Global -0.45* -0.07 n -0.21* -0.33* 
* Indicates that the relation between the governance scores and GDP growth rates is different from zero 
at the 95% level of statistical significance. 
The relationship between the governance scores, on the vertical axis, and real GDP growth rates on the 
horizontal axis, is also shown graphically in Figure 10, which again shows the scores of 155 countries, 
that is 183 countries less 28 EUMS. The EUMS are represented by their average score, (indicated by a 
larger marker). The figure consists of four panels, the first three referring to the three indicators of 
governance and the fourth to the average of these three indicators.  
Figure 10: The relationship between the Governance scores and GDP Growth Rates 
        WGI and Real GDP Growth Rate                                               STB and Real GDP Growth Rate  
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Figure 10 shows that the EUMS, as a block, are characterized by relatively low growth rates, averaging 
1.84%, but at the same time, their governance scores are well above their growth comparators, as 
indicated by the marker representing the EUMS, located well above the trend line. This would seem to 
confirm that good governance need not be associated with high growth rates. 
7. Implications of the results 
7.1 Governance Scores in the EUMS 
The results first and foremost indicate that the governance scores in the EU are high by international 
standard, even when averaging out the EU front-runners with the EU laggards. The results also indicate 
that the rate of growth in the EU was relatively low by international standards, promoting the question 
as to whether or not good governance leads to economic growth. 
7.2 Good Governance and Prosperity 
The indicators presented above, show that desirable governance scores, be they political, economic or 
social, are correlated with GDP per capita. This would seem to suggest that good governance is 
associated with economic prosperity. This conclusion, also often found in the literature, supports 
intuitive thinking, given that good governance is likely to mean responsive administration, better 
institutional set-ups and more efficient utilisation of resources.  
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However the direction of causality of this connection has been questioned, as indicated in the literature 
section, given that it is possible that economic development comes first and this enables the country to 
better afford governance institutions, and not vice-versa. Another possibility is that they are 
simultaneously determined. 
 
7.3 Good Governance and Growth 
The political and social governance indicators considered in this study do not seem to be positively 
correlated with economic growth – on the contrary there seems to be a negative correlation between 
these two variables.   
In the case of the EUMS, some countries which received relatively low governance scores are the fastest 
growing economies among the EUMS. Conversely some of the slowest growing EUMS registered 
relatively low governance scores. This would seem to contradict a commonly held view that growth and 
good governance go hand-in-hand.  
One can argue that this is because the relationship between governance and real GDP growth is likely to 
be between changes (and not levels) in the governance variables, since what matters are improvements 
in this regard.  The reason for this is that Governance improvements may be easier to achieve from a 
relatively low starting point. In other words, it may be more difficult to improve governance once a 
country reaches or almost reaches a peak when compared to a country which has considerable room for 
improvement – an assumption which Briguglio (2015) has termed “diminishing marginal governance 
effect”.14  
Therefore the result of a negative correlation between GDP growth and governance should not be 
interpreted as an indication that good governance is undesirable for growth, and that it should not, be 
pursued.  
On the contrary, the fact that good governance and economic prosperity are correlated, in that the best 
governed countries tend to enjoy the highest standards of living, can be seen as a sign that well-
governed countries do reap benefits in the form of high income per capita, albeit this has occurred over 
a long period of time. It goes without saying, that this conclusion applies to the EUMS, where the most 
prosperous member states are the best governed economies. 
 
 
                                                 
14
 This hypothesis is tested in Briguglio (2015) by regressing changes in real GDP Growth on GDP per Capita and 
on Changes in the WGI. The coefficient on GDP per capita was negative as expected and statistically significant at 
the 95% level. The coefficient on changes in WGI was found to be positive and statistically significant. 
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